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This chapter considers the legal nature and status of Article 37 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.1  Article 37 is a contradictory provision.  It seems full of promise 
as a strongly worded provision on environmental protection included in a charter of 
rights.  It is a source of hope and possibility for those interested in the development of 
an environmental rights paradigm and jurisprudence within EU law and globally.2  
However, Article 37 is also a highly contextualized provision that is inherently 
compromised as a legal ‘right’.3  It is a distinct creation and creature of EU law, and its 
identity in EU law terms is central to understanding its character and legal role.  Its 
compromised nature is highlighted by its drafting history and deliberate inclusion in 
the Charter as a ‘principle’ rather than a ‘right’, and this background fundamentally 
shapes its construction and interpretation as a matter of EU law.   
                                                      
1 ‘Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’ [2012] OJ C326/391 (‘Charter’). 
2 Eg Roderic O'Gorman, ‘The Case for Enshrining a Right to Environment within EU Law’ (2013) 19 
European Public Law 583.  On international rights and environmental protection generally, see Alan 
Boyle, ‘Human Rights and the Environment: Where Next?’ (2012) 23(3) European Journal of 
International Law 613.  
3 Elisa Morgera and Gracia Marín Durán, ‘Commentary on Article 37 – Environmental Protection’ in 
Steve Peers, Tamara Harvey, Jeff Kenner and Angela Ward, The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: A 
Commentary (Hart 2014) (noting that Article 37 ‘fails to take a stance’ on the controversial international 
law question of the existence of a substantive environmental right and also fails to incorporate 
environmental rights of a procedural character).  See also Sanja Bogojevic, ‘EU Human Rights Law and 
Environmental Protection: The Beginning of a Beautiful Friendship?’ in Sionaidh Douglas-Scott and 
Nicholas Hatzis (eds), Research Handbook on EU Law and Human Rights (Edward Elgar 2016). 
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The Chapter explores the legal nature of Article 37 both within the unique 
structure and terms of the Charter itself, particularly in light of its distinction between 
rights and principles, and more broadly within the context of ‘environmental principles’ 
in EU law.  The latter lens shows that Article 37, as a ‘Charter principle’, is in fact part 
of a wider and developing legal discourse concerning EU environmental principles.  
Rather than seeing that Article 37 is deficient because it is not a fully-fledged EU 
fundamental or human right, this perspective shows how Article 37 represents a 
normative progression in EU law, in relation to the principles of integration and 
sustainable development in particular.  EU environmental principles are themselves 
riddled with uncertainty and continue to evolve legally, but they present a pattern of 
legal development (and ambiguity) into which Article 37 fits.  Article 37 makes more 
sense as a legal creature within the broader picture of EU environmental principles and 
their evolving legal roles.  The chapter demonstrates this perspective in three parts.  
First, it examines the legal conundrum presented by Article 37 in the Charter –what is 
a Charter principle in legal terms? – and the limited resources and answers contained 
within the Charter itself and its accompanying Explanations for resolving this 
conundrum.  Second, the chapter examines the nature of environmental principles in 
EU law more broadly and shows how Article 37 fits within this growing body of legal 
doctrine, with its legal limits and complexities.  Third, the chapter considers the 
justiciability of Article 37, both on the state of current case law and its potential 
justiciability in light of its identity as an ‘EU environmental principle’.  Justiciability is 
often at the crux of arguments over whether socio-economic concepts are or should be 
recognized as legal rights.4  This chapter shows that, whilst Article 37 might fall short 
                                                      
4 Particularly whether they can operate as autonomous grounds for challenging public action.  See 
generally Murray Wesson, ‘The Emergence and Enforcement of Socio-Economic Rights’ in Liora 
Lazarus, Christopher McCrudden and Nigel Bowles (eds), Reasoning Rights: Comparative Judicial 
Engagement (Hart 2014). 
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of being an independent ground for reviewing the legality of public action in EU law, 
its role as an environmental principle suggests a number of interesting and potentially 
powerful roles in legal reasoning, including through shaping interpretive practice and 
in otherwise informing the development of EU legal doctrine. 
 
B The Legal Conundrum of Article 37 
Article 37 is a perplexing legal provision for a number of reasons.  It not expressed as 
a ‘right’ but it is contained within a Charter of rights.  Its wording is similar to the 
integration principle in Article 11 TFEU, but its phrasing is not equivalent.  And it sits 
within a Charter whose legal and constitutional status is still being explored and 
understood as a matter of EU law.5  Article 37 provides that: 
A high level of environmental protection and the improvement of the 
quality of the environment must be integrated into the policies of the 
Union and ensured in accordance with the principle of sustainable 
development. 
 
This section explains the definitional and legal complexity of this apparently well-
meaning provision, first by examining its wording, and then by exploring its nature as 
a provision of the Charter with its deliberate distinction drawn between ‘rights’ and 
‘principles’.  The section shows how Article 37 wraps a number of ambiguous elements 
into a single package that was deliberately left unclear as to its precise legal effect.  The 
Charter has created a provision that is ripe for legal interpretation and application, albeit 
outside the more established and developing legal paradigms of EU rights. 
 
Legal Complexity of Article 37 – Charter Wording 
                                                      
5  See genereally Steve Peers, Tamara Harvey, Jeff Kenner and Angela Ward, The EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights: A Commentary (Hart 2014). 
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From the wording of Article 37, a number of aspects stand out in analysing its legal 
meaning.  First, it promotes a ‘high level of protection’ and improving environmental 
quality by requiring these goals to be integrated into the various policy areas that fall 
within the competence of the European Union.  It is thus, similarly to Article 11 TFEU, 
tied to the limited competences of the EU.  This fundamental feature distinguishes 
Article 37 from other constitutional provisions internationally that guarantee a right to 
a healthy or clean environment as a freestanding proposition.6  Its reference to a ‘high 
level of environmental protection’ also resonates with similar references to attaining a 
‘high level of protection’ in other EU laws – both in the Treaties and in secondary 
legislation.7  However, the requirement of a ‘high level of protection’ is not used 
consistently in EU environmental measures and the meaning and significance of this 
legal imperative remains a matter of debate.8   
Second, the wording of Article 37 indicates that it is focused on the pursuit of 
sustainable development.  This again tracks Article 11 TFEU in defining integration of 
environmental protection in terms of sustainable development (albeit that Article 37 is 
more strongly worded in requiring compliance with the ‘principle’ of sustainable 
development).9  This link between integration and sustainable development suggests a 
number of interpretive possibilities as to how these two concepts might define, mutually 
                                                      
6 Eg Article 24 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996) provides ‘Everyone has the 
right (1) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and (2) to have the 
environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable legislative 
and other measures that (a) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; (b) promote conservation; and 
(c) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable 
economic and social development.’  
7 See eg TFEU, arts 114(3), 168, 169, 191(2); Regulation 1907/2006/EC of the European Parliament and 
Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of 
Chemicals (REACH) [2006] 396/1, art 1(1). 
8 Eg Jan Jans and Hans Vedder, European Environmental Law: After Lisbon (4th ed, Europa Law 
Publishing 2012) 41-43.  For a recent analysis of the meaning of a ‘high level of environmental 
protection’ as an EU ‘environmental principle’, see Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case 
C‑444/15 Associazione Italia Nostra Onlus [2016] EU:C:2016:665, paras 24 to 35. 
9  Article 11 TFEU requires integration of environmental protection requirements ‘with a view to 
promoting sustainable development’. 
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reinforce or dilute one another.  Thus it might be argued that the sustainable 
development principle acts as a qualification on the provision’s integration 
requirement, which either strengthens or weakens its environmental protection 
imperative, depending on one’s approach to sustainable development.10  Interpretive 
possibilities relating to these elements are what we have at this stage, due to the 
contested nature of sustainable development as a concept,11 and the equally debated 
nature of integration as a principle in the EU context. 12   From the perspective of 
environmental principles, considered further in the following section, this definitional 
ambiguity and the interconnection of the integration and sustainable development 
principles are part of the wider legal articulation and evolution of these two EU 
environmental principles. 
The final aspect of Article 37’s wording that is noteworthy is how it is different 
from Article 11 TFEU.  Despite the similarities in the wording of these two provisions, 
they have some potentially significant distinctions.  In particular, Article 11 refers to 
‘environmental protection requirements’ that must be integrated into the definition and 
implementation of EU policies and activities, whereas Article 37 of the Charter refers 
to a high level of protection rather than any set of ‘requirements’.  It tends to be assumed 
that the ‘environmental protection requirements’ in Article 11 refer to the wide range 
of environmental objectives, principles and factors that are included in Title XX of the 
Treaty. 13   On this reading, the wording in Article 11 leaves room for potentially 
interesting interpretations and linkage to other EU legal provisions,14 which are not 
                                                      
10 Eg Emily Reid, Balancing Human Rights, Environmental Protection and International Trade (Hart 
2015) 60-61 (arguing that the qualification of sustainable development dilutes the EU integration 
principle). 
11 Michael Jacobs, ‘Sustainable Development as a Contested Concept’ in Andrew Dobson (ed), Fairness 
and Futurity: Essays on Environmental Sustainability and Social Justice (OUP 1999).  
12 Eloise Scotford, Environmental Principles and the Evolution of Environmental Law (Hart 2017) 87-
88. 
13 Jans and Vedder (n 8) 23. 
14 Although this has not been definitively decided by a CJEU judgment. 
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open in the same way on the wording of Article 37.15  It is thus a mistake to think that 
Article 11 TFEU and Article 37 are equivalent EU legal provisions, which are simply 
repeated in different foundational EU texts.  In sum, Article 37 is drafted in a distinctive 
legal form that requires precise analysis and authoritative legal interpretation. 
 
Legal Complexity of Article 37 – Charter Explanations 
The above analysis of the wording of Article 37 shows that its appeal to high level 
concepts and its curious wording give rise to many questions as to its interpretation and 
practical operation.  This ambiguity is compounded by the structure and Explanations 
of the Charter itself, which give some clues as to the nature of Article 37 but again do 
not provide clear direction.  The official Explanation of Article 37 is brief in giving 
background to the provision, stating simply that it is ‘based on Articles 2, 6 and 174 of 
the EC Treaty, which have now been replaced by Article 3(3) [TEU] and Articles 11 
and 191 [TFEU]’.  The Explanation states that Article 37 ‘also draws on the provisions 
of some national constitutions’, but offers no further explanation of the role or meaning 
of the provision.  Whilst it is a common form of phrasing in the Explanations document 
to set out how a Charter Article is based on or relates to other measures in the EU 
Treaties, the European Social Charter or other measures of EU law or the European 
Convention of Human Rights, the explanations for many other Charter provisions are 
more developed, particularly where established CJEU case law informs their 
meanings.16   On one reading, this sparse Explanation indicates that Article 37 does not 
add anything more to Article 3(3) TEU, and Articles 11 and 191 TFEU. 17   This 
                                                      
15 Although Article 37 also has stronger wording in terms of its imperative to integrate a high level of 
environmental protection ‘in accordance with’ the sustainable development principle. 
16 See eg arts 15, 16, 47, 50. 
17 This reading is supported by Gráinne de Búrca’s argument that the Charter was intended as a ‘visibility 
exercise’ or ‘showcase’ aimed not at the policymaker but at the EU citizen, which declares existing EU’s 
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explanation seems to clarify that Article 37 was not designed to create any new legal 
obligations in EU law.18  However, it is also unhelpful to the extent that the three treaty 
provisions referred to are very general provisions setting out the environmental 
protection ambitions of the EU, which have had limited substantive legal effects to date 
in the jurisprudence of the CJEU in terms of guaranteeing any specific environmental 
rights or obligations.  Article 191 is an overarching provision that defines the scope of 
EU environmental policy action very widely, if ambitiously, and its primary legal 
influence is in determining the scope of the EU’s lawful action in this area of shared 
competence.  Thus Article 191(1) provides, like Article 37, that Union policy on the 
environment shall aim to preserve, protect and improve the quality of the environment.  
Notably, Article 191(2) also contains a list of four further environmental principles – 
the precautionary principle, the preventive principle, the principle of rectification at 
source, and the polluter pays principle – which have themselves been generating an 
interesting body of EU legal doctrine, as discussed in the following section.  The 
Explanation’s connection between Article 37 and Article 191 TFEU at least suggests 
that these Articles can and should be mutually supportive provisions in further doctrinal 
development by the Court involving environmental principles.   
 In terms of the potential reach of Article 37 as a general guarantee of 
environmental protection in EU law, Article 11 TFEU and Article 3(3) TEU are 
arguably more relevant provisions in explaining Article 37.  This is because they are 
overarching provisions impacting on all areas of EU activity, indicating that the EU’s 
                                                      
commitments publicly to secure more popular legitimacy: Grainne de Búrca, ‘The Drafting of the 
European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2015) 40(6) EL Rev 799, 802. 
18 Similarly, Article 51(2) provides that the ‘Charter does not extend the field of application of Union 
law beyond the powers of the Union or establish any new power or task for the Union… as defined in 
the Treaties’, although this limit is focused on the Charter and its relationship to the competence of EU 
law and its institutions (and the nature of that competence might still be developing even if it is not to be 
widened).  
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environmental protection goals extend beyond Title XX (the environmental title) to 
other areas of EU policy competence. 19   However, Article 11 TFEU and 
Article 3(3) TEU are also legally ambiguous or at least provisions the legal impacts of 
which are in a state of evolution.  As indicated above, Article 11 is a provision with an 
unsettled meaning in EU law, with limited authoritative jurisprudence clarifying its 
impact to date.  Some commentators highlight that Article 11 is a binding legal 
obligation, which requires that environmental protection concerns be properly 
integrated in all relevant EU policy domains.20  Others suggest that its influence is 
tempered by the need to balance EU policy priorities and that its enforceability through 
legal means is limited, despite its strong wording and prominent position in the TFEU.21  
Analysis of the integration principle in the reasoning of the CJEU shows that it is 
performing notable functions in EU doctrine although its doctrinal use is not yet 
widespread.  The principle has thus played a role in the authoritative interpretation of 
various EU measures, infusing environmental protection requirements into the 
application of EU provisions in different policy domains.22  It has also informed legal 
review tests in ways that both expand the scope of EU environmental competence,23 
and highlight the role of environmental protection in other areas of EU competence.24  
There are also cases in which Advocates General have suggested that Article 11 has a 
more fundamental legal impact, possibly acting as a standalone ground of review in EU 
                                                      
19 This is seen in more specific treaty provisions, such as Articles 114(3)-(5), both obliging the EU to 
pursue a high level of environmental protection in adopting internal market measures and allowing 
Member States to derogate from harmonization measures where justified on environmental protection 
grounds in certain circumstances.  
20 Gracia Marin Duran and Elisa Morgera, Environmental Integration in the EU’s External Relations: 
Beyond Multilateral Dimensions (Hart 2012) 29-33.  
21 Ludwig Kramer, EU Environmental Law (7th ed, Sweet & Maxwell 2012) 20-21. 
22 Eg Case C-513/99 Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab v Helsingin kaupunki and HKL-Bussiliikenne [2002] 
ECR I-7213. See Scotford (n 12) 157-159. 
23 Commission v Council (Environmental Crime) [2005] ECR I-7879.   
24 Eg Case C-440/05 Commission v Council (Ship Source Pollution) [2007] ECR I-9097. 
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law,25 although such suggestions have yet to be fully embraced by the EU courts.26  By 
contrast, Article 3(3) TEU acts as an even more high-level, general statement of the 
EU’s ambitions concerning environmental protection and sustainable development, 
amongst other equivalent priorities, and its doctrinal impact in individual cases relating 
to environmental protection is limited.27   
 In light of all this, a better reading of the Explanation accompanying Article 37 
of the Charter is that, whilst Article 37 adds nothing new and legally radical to Articles 
3(3) TEU and 191 and 11 TFEU, it nonetheless adds weight to these fundamental EU 
legal provisions, which have nascent but evolving roles in developing environmental 
protection obligations in EU law.  This reading serves to accommodate two seemingly 
opposing approaches to the Charter: that there should be no extension of EU legal or 
judicial competence in interpreting the Charter,28 and that the Charter can also be a 
source of authority for the  ‘discovery’ of new principles of EU law.29  These different 
approaches both grasp something important in relation to Article 37 – it is intimately 
connected with existing EU provisions, but these are themselves still being legally 
‘discovered’.  The Explanation to Article 37 is thus more illuminating if one 
consciously takes into account the ambiguous and evolving nature of related, existing 
provisions of EU law.   
 
Legal Complexity of Article 37 – Charter Structure 
                                                      
25 Eg Case C-161/04 Austria v Parliament and Council [2006] ECR I-7183, Opinion of Advocate-
General Geelhoed (26 January 2006) [59] (‘where ecological interests manifestly have not been taken 
into account or have been completely disregarded’). 
26 Cf Case T-229/04 Sweden v Commission [2007] ECR II-2437. 
27 Article 3(3) is usually drawn on in CJEU Judgments and Opinions to set the background of the high 
level of environmental protection of EU policy, usually in combination with Article 191(2): eg Case T-
57/11 Castelnou Energía v Commission [2014] ECLI:EU:T:2014:1021 [211]. 
28 Daniel Denman, ‘The Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2010) 4 EHRL Rev 349. 
29 Koen Lenaerts, ‘Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2012) 8(3) ECL Rev 
375, 376. 
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The Charter’s structure adds a further fundamental obstacle in discerning the legal 
meaning of Article 37, through its deliberate division into provisions that contain 
‘rights’ and those that contain ‘principles’.  This is not simply a Charter of fundamental 
rights as its title suggests.  The final paragraph of the preamble provides: ‘The Union 
therefore recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out hereafter’ (emphasis 
added).  The Charter’s inclusion of principles as well as rights and freedoms 
complicates the analysis of Article 37, since a ‘rights analysis’ is not sufficient in 
determining the legal nature of the Charter’s provisions and the Charter itself leaves 
unanswered questions about the legal distinction between its rights and principles.  
Following the preamble, this distinction is not clearly articulated in the layout and 
language of the Charter30 until it is further elaborated in the ‘general provisions’ of the 
Charter’s final title.  Thus, in Title VII, Article 51(1) provides that EU institutions and 
Member States are to ‘respect the rights’ and ‘observe the principles’ in the Charter 
within the scope of their respective powers in implementing EU law.31  Article 52(5) 
attempts to clarify further this distinction between rights and principles in the Charter 
in terms of their legal effects, indicating that the Charter’s ‘principles’ are to be 
‘implemented’ by EU and Member State institutions within the scope of their respective 
powers and that they are to be ‘judicially cognisable’ only once so implemented.  
Background materials to the Charter also indicate that its principles are to be something 
more than ‘objectives’. 32  Beyond these provisions, the Charter is largely silent on the 
                                                      
30 There are no separate sections for ‘rights’ and ‘principles’ in the Charter, although Title IV contains 
provisions that are more principle-like than right-like.  Certain Articles are explicitly expressed as rights 
(eg ‘Everyone has the right to education and to have access to vocational and continuing training’: 
Charter, art 14), whilst others that have more ambiguous wording (eg ‘The arts and scientific research 
shall be free of constraint. Academic freedom shall be respected’: Charter, art 13). 
31 ‘Respecting’ rights and ‘observing’ principles might suggest different legal functions for rights and 
principles in the Charter although Article 51(1) also proves that both rights and principles are to be 
‘applied’. 
32 The European Council specified the sources on which the Charter should draw, which included the 
ECHR, Member State constitutional traditions, and provisions of the European Social Charter ‘which go 
beyond mere objectives’: Conclusions of the Cologne European Council, June 1999. 
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legal distinction between rights and principles.33  This silence reflects the political 
compromise that was reached in including social rights in the Charter at all, leading to 
the creation of ‘principles’ for provisions concerning social policy that were seen to be 
distinct from individual rights exercisable against the state.34  Charter principles were 
intended to be ‘weaker and less judicially cognisable’.35  In relation to Article 37 in 
particular, Marín Durán and Morgera note that the provision represents ‘is a clear 
manifestation of a lack of consensus among the Member States on a “substantive” 
human right to the environment’.36 
 In light of the limited but deliberate reference to the rights-principles distinction 
in the Charter, a threshold question is how to identify whether particular Articles in the 
Charter contain rights or principles.  States deliberately failed to identify which Charter 
provisions contain principles as opposed to rights, leaving this to judicial interpretation, 
although some provisions are obviously rights due to their wording (‘the right to 
asylum’,37 ‘everyone has the right to freedom of expression’, 38 and so on).  Other 
provisions are more ambiguous.  In some cases, the language of rights might not be 
used but rights are implied (such as the guarantee of non-discrimination in Article 21 
which is phrased without reference to a ‘right’)39 as they reflect rights that are already 
well established in EU law.  In other cases, including Article 37, some provisions are 
                                                      
33 Although the history of the distinction, from its inclusion in the original non-binding incarnation of 
the Charter through to its further endorsement in the proposed Constitutional Treaty and subsequently 
adopted Treaty of Lisbon, offers insight into the reasons for its existence: Chris Hilson, ‘Rights and 
Principles in EU Law: A Distinction without Foundation?’ (2008) 15(2) Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law 193, section 2. 
34 Lord Goldsmith, ‘A Charter of Rights, Freedoms and Principles’ in Mads Andenas and John A Usher 
(eds), The Treaty of Nice and Beyond: Enlargement and Constitutional Reform (Hart 2003). 
35 Jasper Krommendjik, ‘Principled Silence or Mere Silence on Principles? The Role of the EU Charter’s 
Principles in the Case Law of the Court of Justice’ (2015) 11(2) ECL Rev 321, 328.   
36 Marín Durán and Morgera (n 3). 
37 Charter, art 18. 
38 Charter, art 11. 
39 Charter, art 21 provides: ‘Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic 
or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, 
membership of a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be 
prohibited.’ 
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identified as illustrative ‘principles’ in the Explanation to Article 52(2).  Other 
provisions can contain elements of both rights and principles.40  Overall, there is no 
definitive catalogue of the provisions that fall into each category in the Charter.  Thus 
while we have a clear steer from the Charter’s Explanations that Article 37 is a Charter 
‘principle’, there is no bright line conceptual or structural distinction between rights 
and principles articulated in the Charter itself.  This is significant because this 
ambiguity leaves difficult questions about the respective legal implications of rights 
and principles in the Charter.  
 Commentators have adopted various positions in differentiating the legal 
functions of rights and principles in the Charter.  Some focus on the limited 
justiciability of Charter principles to explain their legal character, picking up on their 
‘judicial cognisable’ limitation in Article 52(5).  Daniel Denman thus finds that Charter 
principles ‘do not contain justiciable rights’. 41   Herwig Hoffmann and Burcura 
Mihaescu similarly argue that Charter principles are incapable of granting subjective 
rights to individuals since they ‘merely constitute programmatic objectives which have 
to or might be implemented’.42  Other commentators also focus on the ‘implementation’ 
requirement in Article 52(5) in order for Charter principles to be legally effective, 
finding that they are ‘programmatic norms requiring the intervention of the EU 
legislator or, as the case may be, of the national legislator’.43  Jasper Krommandijk goes 
a step further and proposes three main criteria for identifying those provisions that will 
fall into these two legal categories in the Charter, drawing on work of other scholars: 
(1) the extent to which the provision aims to protect the rights of individuals (how right-
                                                      
40 See the Explanation to Article 52(5). 
41 Daniel Denman, ‘The Charter of Fundamental Rights’ (2010) 4 EHRL Rev 349, 356. 
42 Herwig C H Hoffmann and Burcura C Mihaescu, ‘The Relation Between the Charter’s Fundamental 
Rights and the Unwritten General Principles of EU Law: Good Administration as the Test Case’ (2013) 
9(1) ECL Rev 73, 93. 
43 Leanarts (n 29) 399. 
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like?); (2) the extent to which the protection provided for depends upon further 
concretization in laws (how principle-like?); and (3) the margin of discretion left to 
duty bearers (how principle-like?).44  However, Krommandijk also notes these tests for 
distinguishing between rights and principles are not always decisive and that the context 
of a provision remains important.  Taking a broader legal perspective, Chris Hilson 
makes a compelling argument that there is no bright-line distinction between rights and 
principles in the Charter when analysed as a matter of legal function in EU law.45  These 
various approaches to the Charter’s right-principle distinction shows that there is 
unhelpful uncertainty concerning the legal nature of Charter principles and their 
relationship to the more well established fundamental rights contained in Charter 
provisions.  Nicole Lazzerini sums up the position nicely in referring to the ‘Pandora’s 
box of the right-principles distinction’ that judges fear to open,46 but it is indeed judges 
that will need to open this to shed more certain light on its legal implications.  Section 
D below explores the extent to which they have done this to date.  The analysis above 
however also highlights that Charter principles constitute something legally distinctive 
in EU law.  The following section considers the nature of environmental principles in 
EU more broadly in order to shed more light on the legal distinctiveness of Article 37 
as a Charter principle. 
 
C Article 37 in the Context of EU Environmental Principles 
If Article 37 is a ‘principle’ in the context of the Charter, we are not operating in a 
complete vacuum in determining what this means as a matter of EU law.  Principles 
may be ambiguous legal ideas in the Charter’s own terms but there is a broader context 
                                                      
44 Krommendjik (n 35) 332-334. 
45 Hilson (n 3333). 
46 Nicole Lazzerini, ‘(Some of) the Fundamental Rights Granted by the Charter May be a Source of 
Obligations for Private Parties: AMS’, (2014) 52(3) CML Rev 907, 931. 
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of environmental principles in EU law to which Article 37 relates.47  As the Explanation 
for Article 37 states, Article 37 as a ‘principle’ of EU law that is based on, amongst 
other EU law provisions, related environmental principles in Articles 11 (the integration 
principle) and 191 TFEU (which includes the precautionary principle, the principle of 
prevention, the polluter pays principle, and the principle of rectification at source as 
central planks of EU environmental policy).  A rich body of law has been developing 
around these EU environmental principles, particularly through the case law of the 
CJEU.  However, care is required in discerning the legal nature of principles in this 
context.  This is because environmental principles, just like environmental rights, are 
the subject of much legal hope and aspiration, so that ascertaining their legal roles in 
EU law requires close legal analysis of EU doctrine and legal culture.  This section 
gives some background to this analysis and the pitfalls to avoid in appraising the 
landscape of EU environmental principles into which Article 37 fits. 
 Environmental principles are now popular concepts in environmental law across 
jurisdictions, including in EU law.  This popularity is driven by pragmatism, by political 
compromise, and by hopes to pursue high ideals for environmental protection as well 
as legitimacy for environmental scholarship as a discipline.48  These reasons also apply 
to Article 37 and its development as a Charter principle: the provision is a product of 
pragmatism and compromise mixed with high ideals for environmental protection, 
which has led to high hopes as to its legal impact.  The popularity of environmental 
principles in many jurisdictions, including through their enumeration and articulation 
in international soft law instruments,49 has led some scholars and jurists to suggest that 
                                                      
47 Hilson makes a similar argument, although he looks at the legal roles of principles in EU law even 
more broadly, considering principles of EU constitutional and administrative law: Hilson (n 33). 
48 Scotford (n 12) ch 2. 
49 Eg United Nations Environment Programme, ‘Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the 
Human Environment’ (16 June 1972) UN Doc A/CONF.48/14, 11 ILM 1461 (1972) (‘Stockholm 
Declaration’); World Commission on Environment and Development, ‘Report of the World Commission 
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a global environmental jurisprudence is developing based on a set of normatively 
fundamental environmental principles.50  As I have argued elsewhere,51 such claims 
certainly reflect the growing popularity of environmental principles as legal ideas 
globally but they risk masking the critical differences that exist across legal cultures in 
the development and application of environmental principles as legal concepts.  These 
differences relate not only to the specific principles that are developing legal profiles 
within different legal cultures (the precautionary principle is almost universally popular 
whilst other principles, such as the principle of rectification at source or the principle 
of intergenerational equity, have taken hold in certain jurisdictions only),52 but they 
relate also to the unique doctrinal, constitutional and institutional legal frameworks in 
which particular environmental principles are found and in which they are developing 
their legal identities. 
 Taking into account this sensitivity to legal culture, I have previously 
undertaken a study of the evolving legal roles of environmental principles in different 
jurisdictions, including in the judicial reasoning of their courts.  Based on extensive 
analysis of the case law of the European courts in relation to the six main environmental 
principles that appear in the EU Treaties and the Charter,53 this research shows that EU 
environmental principles have an innovative influence on developing EU law doctrine, 
                                                      
on Environment and Development: Our Common Future’ (20 March 1987) UN Doc A/42/427 
(‘Brundtland Report’) Annexe 1; United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, ‘Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development’ (14 June 1992) UN Doc A/CONF.151/26 (Vol I), 31 
ILM 874 (1992); World Summit on Sustainable Development, ‘Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable 
Development’ (4 September 2002) UN Doc A/CONF.199/20. 
50 Eg Ben Boer, ‘The Rise of Environmental Law in the Asian Region’ (1999) 32 U Rich L Rev 1503, 
1508-9; Brian Preston, ‘The Role of the Judiciary in Promoting Sustainable Development: The 
Experience of Asia and the Pacific’ (2005) 9(2) Asia Pac J Envtl L 109; Tseming Yang and Robert V 
Percival, ‘The Emergence of Global Environmental Law’ (2009) 36 Ecology LQ 615. 
51 Scotford (n 12). 
52 Ibid 6-7. 
53 The precautionary principle, preventive principle, polluter pays principle, principle of rectification at 
source, integration principle and principle of sustainable development: see TFEU, arts 11 and 191(2); 
TEU, art 3(3); Charter, art 37. 
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particularly in informing (and generating) legal tests applied by EU courts in reviewing 
the lawfulness of EU and Member State action within the scope of EU law,54 and in 
giving the courts a broad interpretive discretion in construing EU legislation and the 
Treaties.55  This analysis confirms that the legal roles of EU environmental principles 
are intimately tied to existing doctrines in EU law and are shaped by the jurisdictional 
remit of the EU courts.  It also shows that there are limits to the use of environmental 
principles in legal reasoning.  In particular, environmental principles currently have no 
freestanding roles in legal arguments to compel the exercise of discretion by EU (or 
Member State) institutions to pursue a particular environmental policy.56  Thus they 
cannot be called in aid directly as legal responses to environmental problems.  
Furthermore, they do not fit existing models of ‘legal principles’ in this legal context.  
This is an important consideration since it is tempting to suggest that all so-called 
‘principles’ in EU law are legally equivalent,57 but EU environmental principles – as 
‘substantive’ principles of EU policy – are distinct from the ‘general principles of EU 
law’ developed by the Court of Justice in its jurisprudence,58 which do operate as 
independent grounds for reviewing all EU action.59  
                                                      
54 Eg informing the tests of proportionality and manifest error of assessment in appraising the lawfulness 
of EU action (see eg Case T-13/99 Pfizer Animal Health SA v Council [2002] ECR II-3305, discussed 
below at text accompanying n 64, and Scotford (n 12) ch 4, part V for a detailed explanation of this 
doctrinal effect). 
55 Eg Joined Cases C-418/97 & C-419/97 ARCO Chemie Nederland v Minister van Volkshuisvesting 
[2000] ECR I-4475. For further explanation and examples of this doctrinal effect, see Scotford (n 12) ch 
4, part III.  
56  Furthermore, responding to bolder arguments about the potential legal roles of environmental 
principles, EU environmental principles do not render EU environmental law comprehensively coherent, 
and they do not represent a radical new form of law: see Scotford (n 12) ch 4. 
57 Lenaerts thus seeks to align Article 37 and general principles of EU law by giving Charter principles 
exclusionary effect: Lenaerts (n 29); cf Krommendijk acknowledging the legal differences between 
different kinds of ‘legal principles’ in EU law: Krommendijk (n 35) 328-330.  See also Hilson (n 33). 
58 Takis Tridimas, The General Principles of EU Law (2nd ed, OUP 2007) 4-5. 
59 Environmental principles have not had such a powerful legal function to date (cf Sweden v Commission 
(n 26)), despite some confusing statements by the EU courts that the precautionary principle in particular 
is a ‘general principle’ in EU law: Joined Cases T-74/00, T-76/00, T-83/00 to T-85/00, T-132/00, T-
137/00, T-141/00 Artegodan v Commission [2002] ECR II-4945 [184], and repeated in cases such as 
Case T-475/07 Dow AgroSciences Ltd v Commission [2011] ECR II-05937 and Case T-257/07 France 
v Commission [2011] ECR II-5827.  In these cases, the courts are referring to the fact that the 
precautionary principle acts as a general principle of policy in EU law beyond its articulation in the 
 17 
 These legal roles for EU environmental principles, and their limits, reflect the 
(often implicit) constitutional limits of the EU courts.60  As a general rule, EU judges 
use environmental principles to justify their reasoning only to the extent that they are 
deciding questions about EU environmental competence 61  that has already been 
exercised by EU and Member State institutions on the basis of environmental principles 
and which is then tested in court.  Notably, this conclusion, which can be deduced from 
the now extensive body of EU case law concerning environmental principles,62 mirrors 
the explicit justiciability limit for Charter principles set out in Article 52(5).  This 
provides that principles are to be judicially cognisable only in interpreting and testing 
the legality of legislative and executive acts that first ‘implement’ the Charter principles 
within the scope of EU law.  This similarity of legal function is telling and it indicates 
that Charter principles, including Article 37, are indeed legally similar to other 
environmental principles in EU law.  
 In light of this similar legal function, lessons can be drawn from existing 
jurisprudence on EU environmental principles in making sense of Article 37.  As 
indicated above, environmental principles are used to inform and generate legal review 
tests and as interpretive aids in EU law, and so we might imagine similar roles for 
Article 37.  However, it is noteworthy that these legal roles are flexible ones.  This is 
due to the fact that, as pithy and undefined general phrases, environmental principles 
have contested definitions and open meanings, with the result that, legally, they fall 
                                                      
environmental competence in Title XX TFEU, operating particularly in the field of public health, which 
is subject to an increasingly robust set of administrative law tests.  See Scotford (n 12) 184. 
60 By ‘constitutional’ limits, this refers to the proper role of the Court as an EU institution in constituting 
– alongside the Council, Commission and Parliament – a governing body of the EU. 
61 ‘EU environmental competence’ here refers to the area of EU-prescribed policy authority concerning 
environmental matters within which political institutions – legislative and administrative – can lawfully 
act. 
62 This is one of the key conclusions of my analysis of environmental principles in the legal reasoning of 
the EU courts to date: see Scotford (n 12) ch 4. 
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within a ‘category of concealed multiple reference’.63  Accordingly their use in judicial 
doctrine as interpretive aids and to inform legal review tests, even when courts are 
interpreting or reviewing measures deemed to be based on an environmental principle, 
can give rise to novel interpretive and doctrinal consequences in the environmental 
sphere and widened EU environmental competence.   
 The much-referenced decision in Pfizer v Council is a good example of 
innovative reasoning based on an environmental principle. 64   The precautionary 
principle is used extensively in the reasoning of the Court of First Instance in this case 
to uphold the Commission’s decision to withdraw authorization for an antibiotic used 
as a growth promoter in animals.  A close reading shows that the precautionary 
principle is not simply used as a general reason for upholding the Commission’s 
decision – its legal role is more complex.  Thus it informs established tests of EU 
legality review (proportionality and manifest error of assessment) whilst also 
generating a new test of review (a test of adequate scientific evidence) in this process.65  
The precautionary principle is both constrained by existing EU law doctrine, but also 
allows for innovative legal development by the Court which has scope to elaborate its 
meaning.  The novelty of this reasoning is often overlooked in references to this case 
as a showcase for how the precautionary principle operates legally in EU law. 66  
Another example of the doctrinal flexibility inherent in environmental principles can 
                                                      
63  Julius Stone, Legal System and Lawyers’ Reasoning (Stanford University Press 1964) 246. The 
connection between amorphous ideas like environmental principles and Stone’s legal categories of 
‘illusory reference’ was made by the editors in their introduction to Paul Martin and others (eds), The 
Search for Environmental Justice (Edward Elgar 2015) 2. 
64 Pfizer (n 54). 
65 See a full explanation of this reasoning in Scotford (n 12) 171-176. 
66 Including in the Explanation to Article 52(5) which mentions Pfizer as notable case for demonstrating 
how Charter principles do not give rise to direct claims for positive action by the Union’s institutions or 
Member States authorities and become significant for courts only when such the acts of such institutions 
are interpreted or reviewed. 
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be seen in Waddenzee,67 in which the precautionary principle is used to interpret a key 
provision of the Habitats Directive (since the Directive’s provisions were found to be 
based on this principle), construing its level of protection for special areas of 
conservation very strictly in light of a very strong interpretation of the precautionary 
principle.68  The flexibility of the precautionary principle’s definition allows for this 
doctrinal development, which in this case significantly extended the regulatory reach 
of EU environmental law.  Similarly, as discussed above,69 the integration principle has 
a role in expanding EU environmental competence when used both as an interpretive 
aid and to inform EU legal tests.  Thus, whilst environmental principles may have more 
limited legal functions than fundamental legal rights or general principles of EU law 
such as the principle of equal treatment, their doctrinal impacts can still be significant 
in the reasoning of the EU courts. 
 In considering the legal roles of EU environmental principles, it should be noted 
that the ‘principle’ of sustainable development is something of an outlier in terms of its 
evolution in EU jurisprudence to date.  It is inconsistently referred to as a ‘principle’ in 
the Treaties (although it is explicitly cast as a principle in Article 37),70 and it has a 
derivation that is more connected to international legal developments than any of the 
other EU environmental principles.71  Like the integration principle to which it relates 
in Article 37, the principle of sustainable development is overarching in its Treaty 
ambition, in terms of aiming to link all areas of EU policy competence in line with 
environmental protection and sustainable development goals.  As mentioned above,72 
                                                      
67 Case C-127/02 Landelijke Vereniging tot Behoud van de Waddenzee and Nederlandse Vereniging tot 
Bescherming van Vogels v Staatssecretaris van Landbouw [2004] ECR I-7405. 
68 Ibid [44].  See also Case C-258/11 Sweetman v An Bord Pleanála [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:220. 
69 Above nn 22-24. 
70 See TEU, art 3(3) and TFEU, art 11 that refer simply to ‘sustainable development’. 
71 See Scotford (n 12) 91-93. 
72 See above n 11. 
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it is also a contested concept, and it is often shaped by political winds despite the EU’s 
prominent policy agenda in the field of sustainable development.73  In the reasoning of 
the EU courts, it is thus perhaps unsurprising that the principle of sustainable 
development has given rise to the least developed body of doctrine to date.  Whilst there 
are one or two examples of exceptional doctrinal reasoning,74 the generality of the 
sustainable development principle makes it challenging for courts to find a firm legal 
edge to employ it in developing legal doctrine.75  At the same time, it is a principle that 
is ripe for creative legal arguments to be made about how it might inform EU legal 
doctrine.  This is particularly in light of its prominent articulation in Article 37, with its 
connection to the integration principle in Article 11 TFEU, which has played an 
interesting but so far embryonic role in CJEU reasoning.76  The potential for Article 37 
to foster similar and potentially more extensive doctrinal development is supported by 
the Charter Explanation of its function, which echoes the roles played by other EU 
environmental principles in EU doctrine.  The link to international norms of sustainable 
development also provides space for transnational legal developments relating to 
Article 37 that extend beyond those of EU environmental principles to date.77  At a 
minimum, Article 37 reinforces the legal presence and significance of the sustainable 
development principle (and integration principle) as a matter of EU law.  The following 
and final section of the chapter examines the justiciability of Article 37 to date and the 
prospects of its justiciability in furthering the legal roles of the principles of sustainable 
development and integration in EU law.  
 
                                                      
73 Maria Lee, EU Environmental Law, Governance and Decision-Making (2nd ed, Hart 2014) 64. 
74 Eg Case C-91/05 Commission v Council (Small Weapons) [2008] ECR I-3651. 
75 See Scotford (n 12) 192-198. 
76 Above nn 22-26. 
77 Scotford (n 12) 196-198. 
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D The Justiciability of Article 37 
Ultimately, the unsettled legal meaning of Article 37 of the Charter will be resolved by 
its judicial interpretation and the roles that it takes on in the reasoning of the European 
courts.  This section considers the justiciability of Article 37 in European judgments to 
date, and its potential roles in legal reasoning in light of its character as an EU 
‘environmental principle’.  It concludes that, while the case law to date is limited in 
illustrating the legal effects of this provision, Article 37 has the potential to be 
employed in new and interesting lines of doctrinal development in the future.   
 The starting point for ascertaining the justiciability of Article 37 is Article 52(5).  
As set out above, Article 52(5) explicitly limits the ‘judicial cognisability’ of principles 
in the Charter.  The Explanation to Article 52(5) elaborates this limit, providing that 
Charter principles, including Article 37, become ‘significant for Courts only when 
[legislative or executive acts that implement the relevant principle] are interpreted or 
reviewed’ for their legality and do not give rise to ‘direct claims for positive action’ by 
EU or Member State institutions.78  Article 52(5) was a contentious amendment to the 
Charter in 2009, seeming to introduce ‘some version of the traditional (and much-
criticised) distinction between negatively-oriented civil and political rights and 
positively-oriented economic and social rights’,79 minimizing the justiciability of the 
latter and reflecting that some states (particularly the United Kingdom and Denmark) 
were uncomfortable with affording social and economic guarantees the status of fully 
recognized ‘rights’ in the Charter.  The Working Group charged with determining how 
the Charter might be incorporated into the Treaties suggested that Article 52(5) was a 
‘technical drafting adjustment’ introduced for ‘legal certainty’, to ‘confirm, and render 
                                                      
78 Explanation to Article 52(5). 
79 Paul Craig & Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (OUP 2015) 399. 
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absolutely clear and legally watertight, certain key elements of the overall consensus of 
the Charter’.80   
 This assertion of absolute clarity and legal certainty is overstated.81  In terms of 
the justiciability limit at the heart of Article 52(5), there are two ways in which 
uncertainty remains.  First, the provision is capable of more than one reading.  Thus 
some commentators have sought to give Article 52(5) a wide reading so that Charter 
principles can still act as grounds for legally challenging EU and relevant Member State 
measures that violate Charter principles, albeit on an exclusionary basis.82  Following 
this school of thought, any narrower reading would ‘prevent applicants from 
challenging EU measures or national measures implementing EU law that, though not 
giving expression to those principles, clearly violate them’.83  This wider reading of 
Article 52(5) seems to go against its explicit wording and reflects frustration with the 
fact that some Charter provisions were not cast as rights.84  It also shows that the key 
issue concerning the justiciability of Article 37 is seen to be whether principles can be 
used as a basis for striking down EU, and more contentiously Member State, legislation.  
Other commentators adopt a narrower reading of Article 52(5) as being more 
compatible with its wording and with the proper role of the courts, so that Charter 
principles can only be relied on in legal argument before courts ‘in relation to EU 
                                                      
80 Final report of Working Group II, CONV 354/02 (22 October 2002).  
81 It reflects at least a determination to capture the politically negotiated consensus reflected in the 
Charter’s terms. 
82 Lenaerts (n 29); Krommendijk (n 35) 336 (a narrower reading would ‘prevent judicial review of clear 
violations of principles when the EU or Member States fail or refuse to take action or when there are no 
measures that specifically aim to implement a specific principle’). 
83 Lenaerts (n 29) 400.  
84 See eg S Prechal, ‘Rights vs Principles, or how to Remove Fundamental Rights from the Jurisdiction 
of the Courts’ in JW de Zwaan et al (eds), The European Union: An Ongoing Process of Integration 
(Asser Press 2004) 179 (arguing that narrow approach would be a ‘serious drawback’ when compared 
with earlier protection of fundamental rights by the ECJ).   
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measures or, where appropriate, national measures implementing EU law which give 
expression to those principles’.85   
 The other way in which Article 52(5) remains imbued with legal uncertainty is 
revealed through the legal lens of EU environmental principles.  As shown in Section C 
above, the justiciability limit in Article 52(5) reflects the pattern of legal reasoning 
already observed in EU case law involving environmental principles.  However, whilst 
environmental principles might be restricted in their legal function to aiding the 
interpretation of EU measures and to informing legality review, the analysis in Section 
C above also highlighted that these roles are themselves characterized by uncertainty 
and potential in light of the flexible and open-ended nature of environmental principles.  
Article 37 is no exception in this respect, as it incorporates two of the most contested 
and wide-ranging environmental principles in EU law, the principles of integration and 
sustainable development. 
 So far, so theoretical.  Whatever approach one takes to Article 52(5), what legal 
roles for Article 37 have actually been reflected in the case law of the EU courts?  The 
short answer is that Article 37 has had only limited legal effects in EU judicial reasoning 
to date.  In general, CJEU case law has so far been unhelpful in interpreting the 
Charter’s horizontal provisions in Title VII and particularly in construing the difference 
between rights and principles in the Charter.  Pech suggests that the Court’s reluctance 
to consider these issues ‘may simply reflect the pragmatic wish… to spare itself the 
dreadful task of making sense of the Charter’s general provisions, which aim to 
constrain its interpretation and scope of application’.86  It also may reflect the fact that, 
as Krommendijk points out, some judges see no useful legal distinction between 
                                                      
85 Lenaerts (n 29) 400. 
86 Laurent Pech, ‘Between Judicial Minimalism and Avoidance: The Court of Justice’s Sidestepping of 
Fundamental Constitutional Issues in Romer and Dominguez’ (2012) 49 CML Rev 1841, 1861. 
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principles and rights, indicating how these are legally unsettled concepts in EU law.87  
However, the Charter does make a clear distinction between these concepts and, in 
relation to one Charter principle at least, the Court has emphasized the narrow reading 
of Article 52(5) outlined above,88 finding that Article 26 of the Charter, requiring that 
persons with disabilities should benefit from integration measures, could only be relied 
on for the interpretation and review of the legality of EU legislative acts that implement 
the principle and could not ‘by itself confer on individuals a subjective right which they 
may invoke as such’.89  To date, there has not yet been any similar authoritative CJEU 
reasoning relating to Article 37.  There have however been statements by the court that 
Article 37 does not anything legally to existing Treaty principles concerning 
environmental protection and cannot add a separate basis for invalidating EU 
legislation.90  However, it has been relied on to ‘reaffirm’ the doctrinal importance of 
the integration principle in justifying breaches of free movement law.91  Furthermore, 
at least one Court of First Instance judgment employs Article 37 in an exercise of rights-
balancing reasoning without any fanfare.92 
 True to the trend of more adventurous legal reasoning concerning Charter 
principles appearing in the Opinions of Advocates General, the most developed 
reasoning concerning Article 37 can be found in AG Opinions.93  Different Opinions 
                                                      
87 Krommendijk (n 35) 340-351, although he notes some judges have written on the difference between 
rights and principles in terms of possibilities for judicial review. 
88 Above n 85 and accompanying text. 
89 Case C-356/12 Glatzel v Freistaat Bayern [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:350 [74]-[79].   
90 Case C-444/15 Associazione Italia Nostra Onlus v Comune di Venezia [2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:978 
[61]-[64]. 
91 Case C-28/09 Commission v Austria [2011] ECR I-13525 [121].  See further Bogojevic (n 3) 13-14. 
92 Case T‑614/13 Romonta GmbH v Commission [2014] ECLI:EU:T:2014:835 [76]-[77]. 
93 Advocates General have also been more willing to argue about what constitutes a ‘right’ or ‘principle’ 
in Article 52(5), and to give principles as much legal influence as possible in judicial review cases. See 
in particular the Opinion Advocate General Cruz Villalon in Case C-176/12 Association de médiation 
sociale v Union locale des syndicats CGT [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:491, paras 67-72 (arguing that if the 
reference to ‘such acts’ in Article 52(5) ‘applied exclusively to implementing legislative acts giving 
substance to the principle, there would be a “vicious circle”: those implementing legislative acts would 
be reviewed in the light of a principle whose content, as stated in Article 27 of the Charter, is precisely 
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have variously suggested that Article 37 raises the importance of environmental 
protection to the ‘status of a European target’;94 that Article 37 might resolve doctrinal 
conflicts;95 and that it can help inform the interpretation of EU legislative measures as 
a relevant underlying aim.96  In the latter sense, Article 37 is cast in a legal role that is 
well established for EU environmental principles, as discussed above.97  These cases 
suggest that Article 37 might continue a trend of progressive CJEU reasoning 
concerning environmental protection, 98  including through reasoning involving 
environmental principles.  As Advocate General Cruz Villalon put it in the European 
Air Transport case, Article 37 ‘does not arise in a vacuum but instead responds to a 
recent process of constitutional recognition in respect of protection of the 
environment’.99  Article 37 is very much a continuation of this constitutionalisation 
process, which included the previous introduction of environmental principles into the 
Treaties, and one might expect that it will have legal impacts along similar lines.   
 AG Cruz Villalon takes this constitutional recognition process a step further and 
suggests some innovative reasoning that Article 37 might generate in the future, which 
draws on its transnational legal foundations.  Rather than trying to argue that Article 37 
can be a standalone ground of rights-based review, he suggests that its relationship to 
                                                      
that which is determined by those implementing legislative acts’; this reasoning reflects the wide 
interpretation of Article 52(5) referred to by some scholars above: see n 82 and accompanying text). 
94 Case C-195/12 Industrie du Bois de Vielsalm, Opinion of AG Bot [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:293, para 
82. 
95 C-204-208/12 Essent Begium NV v Vlaamse Reguleringsinstantie voor de Elektriciteits- en Gasmarkt, 
Opinion of AG Bot [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:294, para 95 (seeking to resolve the fraught doctrinal basis 
for environmental protection in justifying infringements of Art 34 TFEU). 
96 Eg Case C-474/10 Department of the Environment for Northern Ireland v Seaport [2011] I-10277, 
Opinion of AG Bot, para 27 (interpreting the consultation requirements of Directive 2001/42/EC on 
strategic environmental assessment); Case C‑535/15 Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg v Jost Pinckernelle 
[2016] ECLI:EU:C:2016:996, Opinion of AG Tanchev, para 73 (interpreting the enforcement provisions 
of the REACH regulation).  
97 Above nn 55-69 and accompanying text. 
98 Eg Case C-240/83 Procureur de la République v Association de défense des brûleurs d'huiles usagées 
(ADBHU) [1985] ECR 531; Case 302/86 Commission v Denmark (Danish Bottles) [1988] ECR 4607; 
Case C-2/90 Commission v Belgium (Walloon Waste) [1992] ECR I-4431. 
99 Case C-120/10 European Air Transport SA v Collège d'Environnement de la Région de Bruxelles-
Capitale and Région de Bruxelles-Capitale [2011] ECR I-07865, Opinion of AG Cruz Villalon, para 78. 
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the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) might nonetheless lead to 
reasoning in support of environmental rights.  Like the Charter, the ECHR contains no 
explicit environmental right as such, but a number of its provisions have been 
interpreted to afford environmental protections (in particular Article 8 on the right to 
respect for private and family life).100  Since the Charter provides that its provisions are 
to be interpreted in line with ECHR jurisprudence,101 Article 37 might be read alongside 
Article 7 of the Charter (the Charter’s parallel right to respect for private and family 
life) and thus interpreted in light of the evolving ECHR jurisprudence on environmental 
rights.  On this basis, AG Cruz Villalon suggests in the European Air Transport case 
that Directive 2002/30 (relating to aircraft noise) can be read so that it does not limit 
the discretion of Member States to offer greater protection to residents from aircraft 
noise pollution.102  The CJEU agreed with AG Cruz Villalon on the outcome in the case 
although it did not refer to Article 37 or ECHR jurisprudence in its reasoning.103  The 
AG’s reasoning in this case shows the doctrinal possibilities of Article 37 as an 
interpretive tool within the constitutional framework of the EU.  Article 37 might not 
act as a freestanding right to environmental protection that individuals can rely on to 
strike down any EU measure that arguably fails to pursue environmental protection or 
sustainable development aims with sufficient vigour, but its doctrinal influence may 
nonetheless be significant in building a body of EU environmental law that is attuned 
to environmental protection priorities.  
 This kind of suggestion for the legal potential of Article 37 links to the role of 
EU environmental principles in CJEU reasoning to date and develops it further.  Like 
                                                      
100 López Ostra v Spain, App no 16798/90 [1994] ECHR 46; Hardy v UK, App 31965/07 [2012] 55 
EHRR 58. 
101 Charter, art 52(3). 
102 European Air Transport (n 99) [82]. 
103 Case C-120/10 European Air Transport SA v Collège d'Environnement de la Région de Bruxelles-
Capitale and Région de Bruxelles-Capitale [2011] ECR I-07865. 
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environmental principles as legal phenomena, Article 37 does not present an 
independent ground of review of EU action, nor does it track pre-existing legal concepts 
in EU law.  Rather, it represents a novel legal form, as highlighted by its legal ambiguity 
in the context of the Charter, which has the potential for innovative reasoning in shaping 
EU doctrinal developments, albeit constrained within doctrinal and constitutional 
limits.   
 
E Conclusion 
Article 37 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights represents a step in the constitutional 
history of environmental protection in EU law.  How significant this step will be as a 
matter of legal reasoning is yet to be seen, but the question of its legal force is more 
complex than simply inquiring whether Article 37 represents a ‘right’ in EU law.  The 
Charter itself makes clear that Article 37 is not a legal right in its own terms.  The 
assumption of some scholars is that its casting as a Charter ‘principle’ risks making 
Article 37 less important as a tool or legal basis of environmental protection.  Whilst, 
in any case, it is very unlikely that a ‘right’ to environmental protection would equate 
to a simple guarantee of beneficial environmental protection outcomes,104 Article 37 is 
a different kind of legal creature.  Its politically fraught creation resulted in a legal 
provision that signals the importance of environmental protection within constraints.  
Those constraints are not clearly laid out in the Charter, as the legal nature of its 
principles is poorly defined, but the experience of EU environmental principles to date 
suggests how these constraints might play out in legal reasoning.  In particular, whilst 
environmental principles cannot be used to challenge all forms of action based in EU 
                                                      
104 See Elizabeth Fisher, Bettina Lange and Eloise Scotford, Environmental Law: Text, Cases and 
Materials (OUP 2013) ch 2. 
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law and can only be relied on by courts where first relied on by lawmakers, the breadth 
of meaning of environmental principles has provided opportunities for innovative 
reasoning that furthers environmental protection goals within existing bodies of EU 
legal doctrine and within EU constitutional constraints.  Article 37 is likely to have a 
similar legal future in EU law, but with the potential to catalyse and amplify the legal 
impacts of environmental principles, particularly in relation to the integration and 
sustainable development principles, which are ripe for further development in EU 
doctrine.  Article 37 also has the potential to forge new transnational legal links to 
related bodies of law, such as that under the European Convention on Human Rights.  
In short, Article 37 is not a legal shortcut to a new right of environmental protection in 
EU law but it has the potential to generate interesting and progressive reasoning in the 
inevitably complex cases involving environmental issues in the European Union. 
 
 
 
 
